page 1 page 2 page 3 page 4 page 5 page 6 page 7 page 8 page 9 page 10 page 11 page 12 page 13 page 14 page 15 page 16 page 17 page 18 page 19 page 20 page 21 page 22 page 23 page 24 page 25 page 26 page 27 page 28 page 29 page 30 page 31 page 32 page 33 page 34 page 35 page 36 page 37 page 38 page 39 page 40 page 41 page 42 page 43 page 44 page 45 page 46 page 47 page 48 page 49 page 50 page 51 page 52 page 53 page 54 page 55 page 56 page 57 page 58 page 59 page 60 page 61 page 62 page 63 page 64 page 65 page 66 page 67 page 68 page 69 page 70 page 71 page 72 page 73 page 74 page 75 page 76
|
entering into safety alliances with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Not one of these ideas seems 6 FEBRUARY 2008 GHI legal column To safely go... The new year could be the ideal opportunity for a new look at ramp safety, declares Len Kirsch. Back in November 2007, the US General Accountability Offi ce (the GAO) published a study entitled Aviation Runway and Ramp Safety, which claimed that the US Federal Aviation Administration has failed to understand the nature and extent of airport ramp safety. Moreover, the GAO places some blame on the FAA for continuing dangers on airport ramps. The Report states that the FAA has (qv): “failed to demonstrate leadership,” has “unreliable technology,” and that FAA staff are often “overworked.” The Report points to the dangers to ground workers caused by “typically small ramps,” congested areas in which departing and arriving aircraft are serviced by ramp workers and the presence of personnel involved in so many different functions. According to the GAO, “when combined with a large number of people utilising equipment in a relatively small area, often under considerable time pressure, an environment has been created in which injuries, including fatalities, and aircraft and equipment damage will undoubtedly occur.” The GAO estimates that ground accidents cost air carriers some US$10bn annually when indirect costs such as cancelled fl ights are considered. However, the GAO admits that research efforts are hindered by a lack of reliable non-fatality data. Personally, I fi nd it diffi cult to believe that this fi gure is correct, especially since the GAO admits they do not have reliable data. The Report states that 29 fatal ramp accidents (of which 17 were ground workers) occurred between 2001 and 2006 at airports ranging from large hubs to small general aviation airports. No airport experienced more than two fatalities during this time period. Most ramp activities occurred when ramp workers were struck by objects such as vehicles, were crushed or fell. This year, three of my clients experienced fatalities within an eight month period (two ground handlers and one FBO). Each of these accidents involved employees disregarding training instructions and could not be traced back to employer failure. Unfortunately, studies often look for excuses for employee injury or death and do not usually place suffi cient blame on employee carelessness (which sometimes cannot be prevented, no matter how much training occurs). The GAO was surprised that there were no federal or industry-wide standards for ramp operations, and that airport rules and regulations were often based on local ordinances or state law. The GAO also questions why ground handlers are required to follow individual airline policies and procedures, which because they are not standard sometimes lead to confusion about operating procedures and safety rules, and thus increase the likelihood of accidents. The Report lists what the GAO considers effective actions by the FAA and others to address ramp accidents. These include airlines setting safety targets; the FAA’s use of runway safety action teams; the airline’s use of ramp towers; and airlines practical. While a ramp tower (similar to a airport tower, but close enough to the ramp so that trained watchers could monitor the activities on the ramp) may make sense at a small commercial airport, it would be too costly and impractical to set up numerous ramp towers at terminals with multiple fi ngers. Moreover, ramp towers may reduce aircraft damage but are unlikely to reduce injuries to ground workers. One of the most important legal implications about this Report is that it provides evidence which may be suffi cient to bring the FAA in as a party defendant in ramp accident or aircraft damage litigation. In fact, my law fi rm is currently suing an airline on behalf of another airline which suffered wing damage when wing tips touched when the aircraft were on two close airport taxi-ways. The aircraft we allege was at fault was being towed by a tug without lights during night time. The Tower, which had instructed the aircraft under tow to stop at the entrance to a third taxi-way, failed to alert our client’s aircraft (under its own power, unable to see the aircraft due to poor lighting) to stop taxi-ing. The existence of this Report will make it easier to persuade a judge or jury to assess at least comparative liability against the FAA for not only failing to instruct our client’s aircraft to stop, but also for allowing a dangerous ramp condition to exist. Ground handlers do not have the ability to persuade airport authorities to alter the design of aircraft ramps, and have limited ability to pressure airlines to adopt more consistent policies. Ground handlers can best contribute to reducing ramp accidents and protecting their employees by continuing to train, retrain and train again their employees, to conduct audits of operations and to provide incentives for improved safety. Handlers who have set up employee incentives for improved workers’ compensation statistics have seen dramatic gains in employee safety. Most importantly, handlers need to better publicise their rôle in promoting ramp safety and work directly with organisations such as OSHA and their non-US or local counterparts to promote safe practices; and perhaps most importantly, assist governments and research organisations to obtain the information they require to fully understand how to improve ramp safety. So, all credit to the National Air Transportation Association (NATA) in the US for taking the lead to gather this information in the US. Handlers can contribute greatly to this endeavour by supplying this information and working with the NATA and the Airline Service Council to provide this information to OSHA and other government authorities. Airlines ñAir One ñAeroflot ñMalev ñAeromist ñTurkish Airlines ñAir Adriatic ñAir Baltic ñAir Moldova ñAir Slovakia ñAlitalia ñArmavia ñBase Airlines ñBelavia ñBlue 1 ñBlue Lin ñBritAir ñCarpatair ñOrenburg Air ñCentralwings ñCityJet ñCroatia Airlines ñCSA Czech Airlines ñDBA ñDniopriavia ñElbrusavia ñEstonian ñPrimaCharter ñFreebird Airlines ñGermanwings ñGB Airways ñTNT Cargo ñAer Lingus ñVim Airlines ñGermania ñIzmir Airlines ñIran Air ñTNT CargoñJettime ñKarthago ñKLM ñKrassair ñLatcharter ñLufthansa Cargo ñMonarch Airlines ñMontenegro ñMy Way Airlines ñOcean Airlines ñOmni Air ñPan Aviation ñPakistan Airlines ñPolet Airlines ñDomodedovo Airlines ñAigle Azur ñDonbassaero ñPulkovo/ Russiya ñQatar Airways ñGeorgian Airways ñRegional Airlines France ñAeroland ñKD AviañSamara Airlines ñSaudi Arabian Airlines ñWhite Airways ñSAS Norway ñFlyglobespan ñSAS Scandinavian Airlines ñSiberia ñStar Air (UPS) ñSun Express ñSwift Air ñTatarstan ñAlbanian Airline ñTesis Aviation Enterprise ñTransaero ñUnited Aviation Services ñUral Airlines ñVueling ñWizz ñKavminvodyavia ñMNG Airlines ñOmskavia ñTNTñPrimaCharter ñFreebird Airlines ñGermania ñIzmir Airlines ñIran Air ñPakistan Airlines ñOmni Air ñPan Aviation ñLatcharter ñLufthansa Cargo ñCityJet ñMonarch Airlines ñAeroland ñKD AviañSamara AirlinesñSAS Scandinavian ñAir One ñElbrusa Airlines ñPulkovo / Russiya ñLufthansa ñEasyJet ñCentralwings ñCityJet ñCroatia ñAigle Azur ñDonbassaero ñBlue 1 ñPulkovo/ Russiya ñFreebird Airlines ñQatar Airways ñWhite Airways Georgian Airways ñRegional Airlines France ñLOT ñKarthago ñKLM ñRegional Airlines France |